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Abstract. Collaborative learning has been hypothesized to be related to the cognitive effort 
engaged by co-learners to build a shared understanding. The process of constructing this shared 
understanding requires each team member to build some kind of representation of the behavior, 
beliefs, knowledge or intentions of other group members. This contribution reports interesting 
findings regarding to the process of modeling each other. In two empirical studies, we measured 
the accuracy of the mutual model, i.e. the difference between what A believes B knows, has done 
or intends to do and what B actually knows, has done or intends to do.  In both studies, we found a 
significant correlation between the accuracy of A's model of B and the accuracy of B's model of 
A. This leads us to think that the process of modeling one's partners does not simply reflect 
individual attitudes or skills but emerges as a property of group interactions. We describe on-going 
studies that explore these preliminary results. 
 
 
Introduction 
It is now broadly admitted that learners do not benefit from collaboration simply because they are in a 
group but because collaboration triggers additional activities such as explanation, disagreement and mutual 
regulation (Dillenbourg, 1999). After Roschelle and Teasley (1995), many CSCL scholars conceptualized 
collaborative learning as an activity in which shared knowledge is constructed by peers through their interactions 
with each other and also with their environment. The notion of shared knowledge is derived from psycholinguistic 
concept of “grounding” (Clark &Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986): during interactions, the “interactants” constantly try to ensure 
of a good mutual understanding. Grounding is the collective process by which the individuals engaged in a 
conversation try to guarantee their mutual understanding. 'Shared understanding' or 'mutual understanding' are very 
intuitive concepts, both for analyzing interactions and for designing applications, which probably explains their 
impact on CSCL. However, this notion is questioned both within psycholinguistics (Sperber & Wilson, 1986) and 
within CSCL (Baker, Hansen, Joiner & Traum, 1999; Koschmann & LeBaron 2003). Our research questioned it in a 
different way: we zoomed in on the mechanics of grounding, by analysing how a shared solution emerges from the 
sum of a long sequence of contributions (Dillenbourg & Traum, 2006). Our approach goes one step further: We 
attempt to understand the socio-cognitive benefits of co-constructing a shared understanding. We investigate a 
mechanism that is hypothesized to lie at the heart of grounding. For Clark and Brennan (1991), common grounds are 
a set of mutual beliefs defined as the amount of information shared (e.g. presuppositions, knowledge, assumptions, 
beliefs). Establishing this set of beliefs requires that the co-learners build some representation of their partners’ 
knowledge, beliefs and goals. We referred to the process of building assumptions about the beliefs and the 
knowledge of their partner(s) as mutual modeling (Dillenbourg, 1999). However the abstract and unobservable 
aspect of this process raises methodological challenges regarding its apprehension by researchers. Therefore, this 
contribution attempts to ask the general question of the socio-cognitive nature of mutual modeling, by assessing 
whether the process of modeling one's partner is grounded at the individual or the group level. 
 
The paper does not describe environments for collaborative learning but reports basic research on the socio-
cognitive mechanisms related to mutual modeling. The first section explores the concept of mutual modeling and its 
relationship with CSCL features such as scripts and awareness tools. The second and third sections report empirical 
studies in which the accuracy of mutual models has been measured. The conclusion section describes how the 
hypotheses that come out of these two studies are currently being investigated through two other studies, which 
focus on CSCL setting with a stronger educational flavor. 
 
Mutual modeling in collaborative task 
The ability to understand the partner's understanding and to adapt to his/her viewpoint has been 
investigated under the labels of intersubjectivity (Wertsch, 1985; Bromme, 2000) and audience design (Lockridge & 
Brennan, 2002). Suthers (2006) recently proposed “the technology affordances of intersubjective meaning-making” 
as an integrative agenda for CSCL research. In his sense, a common denominator of understanding learning in a 
collaborative setting is the peers’ attempt to make sense of situations and of each other. Intersubjectivity is played in 
the field of the physical and historical context available to the participants to jointly compose interpretations, which 
could be considered as a new gist – alternative to the notion of producing mutual-beliefs about making unshared 
information shared – for collaborative learning. To sum up, taking into account the peer’s perspective is a crux facet 
of intersubjectivity on which most of the social activities rely. As highlighted by Malle (2003), the ability to 
represent and reason about self and other’s mental states (e.g. beliefs, desires, intentions, mere thoughts, 
experiences, emotions, attitudes) is a great achievement of the human mind evolution that is considered as a 
prerequisite for many social and cognitive processes such as natural language acquisition, social interaction, 
reflexive thought, and moral development.  
 
The term "mutual modeling" does not imply that collaborators maintain a detailed representation of their 
partner's knowledge, nor an explicit one. Simply stated, if A wants to (dis-)agree with B, A needs some 
representation of B's intentions; if A wants to repair B's misunderstanding, A needs some representation of what B 
has understood. Mutual modeling is as functional as the grounding process: the degree of accuracy depends on the 
task requirements; it has to be extremely high if two pilots collaborate on landing a plane, as in Hutchins' (1995) 
observations, but can be much lower if they discuss about their last party (down to what politeness allows). 
Moreover, this mutual model is not constructed in a vacuum but is based on multiple inference mechanisms. 
Common grounds are initialized by the assumptions people make about their partner from cues such as his/her 
community membership (age, culture, profession, ...) and from co-presence (e.g. common ground includes any event 
to which A and B attended together) (Clark & Marshall, 1981). Several scholars studied how this initial model 
imparts on communication, namely because it can easily be manipulated. For instance, Slugoski, Lalljee, Lamb & 
Ginsburg (1993) pretended to the subjects that their (fake) partner has or not received the same information. They 
observed that the subjects adapt to their partner by focusing the explanation on the items that (s)he is supposed to 
ignore. Brennan (1991) showed that the subjects used different initial strategies in forming queries depending on 
who they were told their partner was. Other simpler inference mechanisms such as default reasoning rules (e.g. B 
agrees with me unless he disagrees) are developed according to the conversational context. The mutual modeling 
could not occur independently from culturally acquired interaction schemata that constrain the space of 
interpretation of the other's behavior. Actually, the CSCL notion of 'scripts' (Dillenbourg, 2002) can be 
conceptualized as providing co-learners with an explicit schema that narrows down the space of interpretations and 
hence serves as prosthesis for mutual modeling. Another prosthesis for mutual modeling is the notion of awareness 
tools (Greenberg, Roseman, 1996); these are features of CSCW environment in which A is informed about B's 
actions that A does not directly perceive. 
 
Even when mutual modeling is not detailed and explicit, reasoning on what one's partner believes involves 
some cognitive load. For Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs (1986), what is important is not the individual effort made by the 
receiver of a communicative act, but the overall least collaborative effort. The cost of producing a perfect utterance 
may be higher than the cost of repairing the problems which arise. For instance, subjects are less careful about 
adapting utterances to their partner when they know they can provide feedback on his/her understanding (Schober, 
1993). We introduced instead the notion of ‘optimal collaborative effort’ (Dillenbourg et al, 1996) to stress the fact 
that misunderstanding should not be viewed as something to be avoided (even if this were possible), but as an 
opportunity to explain, to justify, and so forth. Here we enter into the global argument regarding cognitive load in 
learning activities, namely in discovery learning environments: there is no learning without cognitive load, but 
overload may hinder learning (Paas, Renkl & Sweller, 2003). In the context of collaborative learning, we understand 
the cognitive load induced by mutual modeling as part of Schwartz (1995) notion of effort towards a shared 
understanding. For instance, conflict-resolution scripts or JIGSAW scripts are purposely designed for augmenting 
(reasonably) the effort group members have to engage to reach a shared solution. 
 
Mutual modeling has many dimensions, from which we dissociated 'dispositional' versus 'situational' 
aspects. The 'dispositional' aspects refer to A's representation of B's long term knowledge, skills or traits. It is hence 
closely related to the notion of transactive memory (Wegner, 1987; Moreland, 2000). 'Situational' aspects refer to 
A's representation of B's knowledge, behavior or intention specifically activated in the situation in which A and B 
collaborate. 
 
This leads us to the long term research question that underlies our work: does the mutual modeling process 
contribute to the learning outcomes of collaborative problem solving? This question is difficult to investigate 
because the degree of mutual modeling is both difficult to manipulate as an independent variable, and difficult to 
measure as a dependent variable. Measuring it is difficult because, as soon as one asks learners what their partner 
knows, is doing or intends to do, we trigger a modeling process beyond what it would 'naturally' be. Controlling the 
degree of mutual modeling is also difficult. As we mentioned earlier, scripts and awareness tool potentially 
influence the mutual modeling process, being some kind of prosthesis. Now, as for any prosthesis involved in 
learning, we ignore whether scripts and awareness tools will augment the mutual modeling process (by scaffolding 
it) or inhibit it (by making it useless). Moreover, it is difficult to estimate the accuracy of a mutual model in absolute 
terms. Hence, this contribution focuses on a simple question: considering M(A,B) as being A's representation of B, 
what is the relationship between M(A,B) and M(B,A)?  
 
Actually, an alternative hypothesis is that participants do not build a representation of their partners' mental 
states but instead a representation of the interaction process at the group level: instead of modeling who knows what, 
who does what or who said what, the team members could maintain a representation of what the team knows, has 
done or has said. We refer to this as the group model. This alternative is directly inspired by distributed cognition 
theories (Pea, 1993; Salomon, 1993; Hutchins 1995) and the team mental model (Canon-Bowers, Salas, Converse, 
1993). The two hypotheses are of course complementary since these two models feed each other.  
 
This contribution does not answer these general research questions but report some results collected in two 
empirical studies on mutual modeling, respectively in a virtual environment and in real space. These results are 
discussed under the light of social and cognitive theories. The discussion also mentions on-going studies on the 
mutual modeling process within more traditional collaborative learning settings.  
 
Study 1. 
We attempted to measure mutual modeling by using awareness tools in a collaborative video game called 
Spaceminers. The research question was to study the impact of an awareness tool on group performance and mutual 
modeling. The availability of an awareness tool was our independent variable. The main results have been published 
in (Nova, Wehrle, Goslin, Bourquin, Dillenbourg, 2006). We focus here on the question addressed in the 
introduction, that is the relation between the modeling performed by each user or the relation between M (A,B) and 
M (B,A). Our main dependent variable is the mutual modeling accuracy, hereafter referred to as MM-accuracy 
 
Experiment design 
SpaceMiners is a 3D computer game that involves two players in space missions in which they have to 
collect minerals located in asteroids and bring them to a space station.  To do so, they shoot drones through the 
space after choosing their initial direction and speed. Once launched, the trajectory of drones is only influenced by 
the gravity of planets and by specific tools that players collaboratively position between planets.  
 
During the experiment, the teams were confronted with three increasingly complex situations. The 
experiment was 2 hours long, with a 30 minutes tutorial and 3 levels of 30 minutes. Thirty-six persons participated 
in this study, all native French speakers. We constituted 18 pairs of participants (N = 18) who were not familiar with 
each other. The pairs were assigned randomly to either the Control condition (without the awareness tool) or the 
awareness condition (with the awareness tool). In the awareness condition, team members could view what their 
partner was looking at and hence were expected to infer more accurately his/her teammate's intentions. Each player 
sat in front of a distinct computer located in different rooms. They interacted with the game using a regular Logitech 
joystick and communicated with each other through an audio channel. 
 
Measures 
Task performance was measured as the score reached by the subjects after three situations. In order to 
evaluate the mutual modeling accuracy during the task, we used two questionnaires as shown on Figure 1. Both of 
them were displayed during each of the 3 phases of the game, as a transparent layer appearing on the game level. 
The first questionnaire concerned the player’s intended actions. It asked each player about what they were intending 
to do at the moment (guiding his partner, trying to understand his strategy, trying to establish a common strategy, 
adjusting a shoot, etc.).  Then, the second questioned asked each player about what he thought the partner was 
intending to do. Some answers were identical in both questionnaires (like “adjusting a shoot”) while others were 
reversed. For instance, the answer "guide him" will be reversed as "guide me" and vice-versa. Each questionnaire 
then had 10 questions that covered the basic actions that could be performed.  
 
Figure 1: Crossed questions for measuring mutual modeling accuracy. 
 
These questionnaires gave us the possibility to compare player A’s prediction about B’s intentions with B’s 
self-declared intentions. Of course, this method faces the limits of any questionnaire in which somebody has to self-
declare his or her intentions. We compared the first answer of a player (about what A is intending to do) to the 
answer of his partner to the second question (about what B believes A is doing). Our estimation of MM -accuracy 
has been computed as the number of common answers given by the two players to those two questionnaires: does 
A's prediction of B's answer matches B's actual answer? Since there were 3 evaluations (one per level), we 
computed the MM-accuracy per individual for each level of the game. The global MM-accuracy is the sum of these 
3. 
 
Findings and Discussion 
The awareness tool permitted higher group performance, but it did not improve the accuracy of the mutual 
model. However, within the experimental group, the pairs who intensively used the awareness tools obtained a 
significantly higher MM accuracy (for more details, see Nova et al., 2006). In order to compare M (A,B) and M 
(B,A), we computed intraclass correlation as described by Kenny et al. (1998) from the answers to the cross-
questionnaires. We found a positive and significant correlation (r = .38, p < .05) between M (A,B) and M (B.A). 
This sounds as a minor result for this particular study but actually conveys an important outcome: mutual modeling 
appears to be a group variable rather than a personal activity. We expected MM-accuracy to be a personal 
parameter, i.e. that some participants spontaneously pay more attention or engage more effort in monitoring their 
peer. This could be due to some social attitude or to specific cognitive skills required to build a mutual model. This 
strong correlation supports a different hypothesis in which mutual modeling emerges as a property of the quality of 
interactions among peers: some pairs seems to collaborate in such a way that their verbal and non-verbal interactions 
produce more cues available to both partners so that they can build a mutual model. This does not remove individual 
variability (correlation was not 1). Interestingly, we found that the relation between M(A,B) and M(B,A) was not 
very different in the two conditions: the average absolute difference between  MM-Accuracy (A,B) and MM-
accuracy (B,A) is not significantly different with or without the awareness tool ( F [1,13]= 0.1445, p-value = 
0.7097) 
  
Study 2 
In this second study, instead of evaluating mutual modeling during the task, we chose to measure it after 
task completion. This experiment was based on a pervasive game called Catchbob. As for the previous experiment, 
this game was used to evaluate the influence of awareness tools on group performance and MM-accuracy, but we 
will focus here on the results about the relationship between M(A,B) and M (B,A). 
 
Experimental design  
Catchbob is an experimental platform implemented as a mobile game in which groups of 3 players have to 
solve a joint task. The game was played on the school campus and participants had to find a virtual object ('Bob') 
and catch it by forming a triangle around it. Players used a Tablet PC that displays a map of the campus and an 
indication of their personal distance from Bob. Their annotations on the map were shared with the two other players, 
but fadeout after a few minutes. The awareness tool displayed the location of the two other players on the map. 
Hereafter, we refer to this information as mutual location awareness (MLA). It constituted our independent variable. 
 
In this study, we selected groups of students from the same class and hence who knew each other. Ninety 
students participated in this experiment. We assigned 10 groups of 3 persons to each of our three experimental 
conditions: the control condition (without MLA) and two experimental conditions: synchronous MLA (display 
current position of each player) and asynchronous MLA (display current position of each player and their spatial 
trace). We controlled group gender so that each condition was made up of 25% of female and 75% of male. 
 
Measures 
As dependent variable, we measured MM-accuracy by asking players to draw their own path and the one of 
each of their partners after the game. This enabled us to calculate the number of errors players made while drawing 
the path of their partners. We compared the path player A attributed to B with B's real paths recorded by the system 
and the same for A&C or B&C as depicted on Figure 2.  
 
  
 
 
Figure 2: (Left) Drawing A made of B's path; (Right) Real path followed by B as extracted from the logfile. 
 
We computed the number of errors between M(A, B) and M(system, B). What we counted as an error 
where either a place where the partner have not been or a place where he/she had gone but he/she has not drawn. 
Three criteria have been defined to describe what an error was: distance (if the line was longer than the maximum 
size of our campus corridor), presence of an obstacle (door/wall/glass), walking back was not perceived as an error. 
An individual MM-accuracy is the sum of errors made by a player about his/her two partners’ paths. We calculated 
MM-accuracy for each individual (M (A,B), M (B,A), M (A, C), M (B,C),…) and for each group (the sum of the 
individual measures). It is important to stress that subjects made very few mistakes when drawing their own path on 
the campus (85% made 0 errors). This enables us to consider mistakes in their partners' path as being due to a lack 
of mutual modeling accuracy instead as being due to spatial skills (e.g. a difficulty in reporting trajectories on a 
map). 
 
Findings and Discussion 
We did not find any significant difference regarding the task performance between the three experimental 
conditions. However, our surprise was that the absence of the awareness tool led player to higher MM-accuracy: 
players better remember their partners’ path if they had not seen their position permanently. We will not enter into 
the details of these results but simply stress that teams without MLA did more annotations on the map. It seems that 
permanent MLA has an underwhelming effect (Nova et al., 2005). Let us now focus on the relationship between M 
(A,B) and M (B,A). We checked the intra-group dependence of the results through the computation of intra-class 
correlation: the correlation is again positive (r = .41) and significant (p = .01). The number of errors made by the 
subjects is correlated with the number of errors made by the other partners. This result confirms the correlation 
found in the first study.  This second result is even more surprising for us than the former: despite the high 
heterogeneity of spatial representation skills among adults (see for instance Liben et al, 1981), this high correlation 
indicates again that MM-accuracy reflect more group processes than personal features. Since team members did not 
interact massively during the task, the intra-group correlation may not be explained by the quality of verbal 
interactions but by other aspects of their collaboration, probably the quality of the task strategy that emerged in the 
group. However, the relation between strategy and MM-accuracy is complex: if we do a post-hoc split, groups with 
a high level of MM-accuracy do not perform better than pairs with low MM-accuracy ( F[1,17] = 1.4456,  p = 
0.2452).  
 
Discussion and further studies 
These two studies results revealed a correlation between the model peers build about each others’ behaviors 
and intentions. Simply stated, if a team member A build an accurate model of his or her partner B, then B also tends 
to build an accurate model of A. The conclusion we draw at this point is that the activity of modeling the partner is 
not reciprocal but mutual. A reciprocal relationship means that modeling is mainly an individual activity where A 
infers M (A,B) from B's actions and utterances. A mutual relationship implies that M(A,B) and M(B,A) are jointly 
constructed through interactions. The term 'mutual' may mean that not only A builds M(A,B), but he also builds 
M(A, M (B,A)). We will not enter in the long debate on the possibility of an infinite regress of nested models 
(discussed in Smith, 1982 or in Clark, 1996). Another interpretation is that team members actually build a model of 
the group-in-interaction, something like M (A, AB).  We are not able to choose among different hypotheses at this 
stage, since the reported experiments were not designed for exploring these issues.  
 
These findings emerged as side-effects of other questions. The positive aspect of these results is that the correlation 
has been observed in two different contexts: virtual space in study 1 versus real space in study 2, groups of 2 in 
study 1 versus groups of 3 in study 2. Moreover, these results have been found using different methods: on-task in 
study 1 versus off-task in study 2, subjective validation (comparing A's model to B's answer) in study 1 versus 
objective validation in study 2 (comparing A's model with B's behavior). This diversity somewhat consolidates our 
results but these results are still preliminary: the selected tasks were not proper learning tasks and, overall, we still 
face serious methodological difficulties. On the one hand, asking learners ‘on task’ what their partner knows, is 
doing or intends to do triggers a modeling process which could alter the natural modeling process, and on the other 
hand, providing learners with an ‘after-task’ survey may imply mnemonic and rationalization biases. In other words, 
the abstract and unobservable characteristics of the mutual modeling process imply methodological challenges that 
call for indirect measures and assessment methods. Furthermore, mutual modeling in everyday life involves a large 
variety of mental states to be represented such as knowledge, behaviors, beliefs, desires, intentions, emotions, traits, 
attitudes, etc. Three of these mental states are particularly relevant in collaborative learning situations, namely 
inferences about partners’ knowledge, behavior, goals (intentions). Study 1 focused essentially on inferences about 
peers’ intentions while study 2 investigated inferences about peers’ behavior. Our on-going study focuses on the 
inferences about peers’ knowledge that is expected to be the most important aspect of mutual modeling in 
collaborative learning.  
 
Our current empirical studies investigate the mutual modeling process in conceptual learning. The goal of these 
experiments is twofold. Our theoretical question is whether or not the mutual modeling effort enhances collaborative 
learning gains. Our methodological question is to capture the mutual modeling mechanisms. In order to avoid the 
‘anticipation’ and ‘rationalization’ biases, we use interaction analyses and parallel gaze analysis. We are therefore 
using two eyes-tracking machines and we perform an automatic comparison of the eye paths of both learners as in 
(Richardson & Dale, 2005).  These experiments use the two MM prostheses described in the introduction, awareness 
tools and scripts. In both cases, subject start by reading a text individually (Phase 1) and then have to build a concept 
map together (Phase 2). In the first experiment, the independent variable is an awareness tool available during Phase 
2: A is informed of B's knowledge on three different chapters of the learning material; this knowledge has been 
previously measured through a pre-test at the end of Phase 1.  In the second experiment, different scripts are 
implemented by providing subjects with complementary partial texts (jigsaw script) or conflictual texts 
(argumentation scripts) in phase 1. Both of these experiments manipulate the mutual modeling process in complex 
collaborative learning situations. Awareness tools about peer’s knowledge (and behavior in general) may trigger 
mutual modeling facilities whereas the ‘collaborative scripts’ may strain effort of mutual understanding and by 
extension, enhance mutual modeling and perspective taking and making efforts. In a circular (if not spiral) manner, 
this increase in the mutual modeling effort may elicit interaction processes such as audience design, mutual 
regulation, elaborated explanation asking and providing, which are known to be beneficial for learning. 
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